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Abstract
It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly
workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retire-
ment. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be
no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that when first-best
redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not
observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement de-
cision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the
optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ
in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their
weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal
non linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when
weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals’
productivity and health status are not observable.
JEL classification: H55, H23, E62
1 Introduction
A trend towards early retirement is currently observed in most European
countries. Participation rates for men aged 60 to 64, which were above
70% in the early sixties, have fallen to 57% in Sweden and to below 20%
in Belgium, France Italy and the Netherlands. Similarly, the average labor
participation in the age group 55—64 has declined and now ranges from 24
per cent in Belgium, to 88 per cent in Iceland, with the bulk of countries
closer to Belgium than to Iceland. Early retirement per se is of course a
blessing for a society which values consumption of leisure. However, it also
puts pressure on the financing of health care and pension schemes. This
problem is made worse by growing longevity. In the European Union life
expectancy at age 65 has increased by more than one year per decade since
1950. As a consequence, instead of 45-50 years of work and 5-10 years of
retirement of half a century ago, a young worker can now expect to work for
30-35 years and retire for 15-20 years.
The effective retirement age varies across individuals and depends on
features such as wealth, productivity and health. In addition, retirement
decisions are likely to be affected by the pension system. When there is no
pension system, (utility maximizing) people retire when the marginal utility
of inactivity is equal to their marginal productivity at work. People in poor
health and with low productivity will retire earlier than people in good
health and with high productivity. When there is a pension system, this
tradeoff may or may not be affected, depending on the design of the benefit
formula. In a first-best (full information) setting, an optimal retirement
system would imply the same tradeoff. Such a pension system can be referred
to as neutral or actuarially fair.1
In reality, pension systems are typically not neutral and they distort the
1We are concerned with actuarial fairness at the margin (no distortion) and not with
global actuarial fairness (benefits are equal to contributions) which, by definition, is vio-
lated by a redistributive scheme.
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retirement decision. As it has been shown by a number of authors, notably
Gruber and Wise [1999] and Blondal and Scarpetta [1998] the observed
age of retirement is likely to be distorted downwards in a number of coun-
tries. The main explanation for this distortion appears to be the incentive
structure implied by social protection programs aimed at elderly workers:
pension plans but also unemployment insurance, disability insurance and
early retirement schemes. The authors show that prolonged activity for el-
derly workers is subject to an implicit tax which includes both the payroll
marginal tax and forgone benefits. Consequently, social protection systems
are far from being actuarially fair at the margin in countries such as Bel-
gium, France, Germany or the Netherlands where people retire relatively
early. On the other hand, in Japan, Sweden and the US the implicit tax is
much lower so that the system tends to be rather neutral and people retire
much later.
These results are essentially positive. Nevertheless, they are often, at
least implicitly, given a normative connotation and used to advocate re-
forms tending to remove the bias in the benefit formulas. This raises the
question of whether a bias in the benefit formula in favor of early retirement
is necessarily the sign of a bad policy. We show in this paper that this
implicit tax on postponed retirement is not necessarily due to bad design
but can be due to the desire by public authorities of using social security for
redistribution when non-distortionary tools are not available.
To address this issue we determine the social security benefits, payroll
taxation and retirement age policy that are optimal from a utilitarian per-
spective. We consider a setting with heterogeneous individuals differing in
two unobservable characteristics: level of productivity and health status.
We study the design of a non linear tax-transfer function depending upon
two variables: the weekly income and the retirement age2. We show that in
a setting of asymmetric information, a distortion towards early retirement is
2See Maderner-Rochet (1995) who also deal with this problem in another setting.
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desirable for some individuals. More precisely, the optimal policy in the two
type case induces highly productive and healthy workers to retire efficiently
(namely when their labor disutility is marginally equal to their productivity)
while less productive and less healthy workers are induced to retire earlier.
We also show that the tradeoff between weekly labor supply and retirement
age (for a given lifetime income) may or may not be distorted. When a
distortion is called for, its sign depends on whether the “dominant” source
of heterogeneity is health or productivity. When individuals differ mainly
(or exclusively) in productivity, the distortion goes against weekly labor
supply. When health differentials are dominant, the distortion goes against
retirement age.
The two dimensions of heterogeneity are a crucial ingredient of our anal-
ysis. When designing a redistributive social security system, it is important
to take into account the wide variability in the capacity to work — a variabil-
ity that is likely to widen as life expectancy increases. The practical issue is
how to care for elderly workers who are in poor health without, at the same
time, opening the door of retirement to those who would like to stop working
but are quite capable of continuing. Consequently, a reform of social secu-
rity ought to include a close connection between pensions systems and the
system of disability insurance as well as the determination of a more flexible
retirement age together with actuarial adjustment of yearly benefits. The
ideal outcome would then be to have early retirees because of poor health
receive relatively generous benefits while early retirees unwilling to continue
working would receive actuarially low pensions.
There exists a theoretical literature dealing with various aspects of the
issue of social security, disability insurance and retirement. It focuses on
long-term labor contracts encompassing retirement rules [Lazear, 1979] and
the implicit inducement to retirement of existing public and private pension
plans [Crawford-Lilien, 1981, Fabel, 1994]. This literature is mainly positive;
it analyzes retirement behavior in order to explain the observed evolutions
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in retirement practice. Our paper uses a normative approach which is in-
tended to provide a benchmark against which the positive results can be
assessed. In that respect, it is in the vein of Diamond and Mirrlees (1986)
who derive disability contingent retirement rules.We shall further discuss
the link between our approach and earlier work in the concluding section.
At this point, it is important to stress that we encompass income taxation,
disability insurance, early retirement schemes and social security in our non
linear tax-benefit scheme. To pursue this rather ambitious endeavor we ad-
mittedly have to simplify other aspects of the model. In particular, we
essentially assume away the intertemporal aspects which would bring in is-
sues of uncertainty, commitment, liquidity constraints, etc. Unemployment
insurance is not considered either as we assume full employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
basic model while the laissez-faire and the first-best solutions are studied in
Section3. In section 4 the second-best policy is studied. We characterize the
optimal (incentive compatible) utilitarian allocation and the implementing
income tax and social security benefit functions. To keep the presentation
simple we focus on an economy with two types of individuals. Section 5
provides some numerical examples which illustrate the analytical results
and provide some results for a three-type setting.
2 The model
Most of our analysis is based on a reduced form specification. We start by
presenting the underlying micro model and show how it leads to the specifi-
cation we use. This detour is necessary to grasp the proper interpretation of
our setting. Consider an individual who has preferences over consumption
c and labor l which can be expressed by an instantaneous utility function
U (t) assumed to be additively separable:
U (t) = u (c (t))− r(t)V (l (t))
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where u and V fulfill the usual assumptions and r(t) denotes the instanta-
neous increasing intensity of labor disutility. Let date 0 denote entrance to
the labor force, h, the maximum life-span and z, the retirement age (length
of working life). For simplicity we shall often refer to l as “weekly” labor
supply. Though somewhat abusive, this terminology is also useful to avoid
confusion with z which represents another dimension of (lifetime) labor sup-
ply. Assuming the interest rate and the discount factor both equal to 0,
lifetime utility can be written as:
U =
hZ
0
u (c (t)) dt−
zZ
0
r(t)V (l (t)) dt. (1)
Assuming a constant weekly productivity w over time, the lifetime budget
constraint is:
hZ
0
c(t)dt =
zZ
0
[wl(t)− τ(wl(t))] dt+ (h− z)p(z) (2)
where τ(wl(t)) is an instantaneous non linear tax depending on labor in-
come and p(z) the instantaneous level of pension which may depend on the
individual’s retirement age (via the benefit formula). The total (lifetime)
retirement benefits are given by (h− z)p(z). For the sake of simplicity, we
impose that l (t) = l is a time invariant choice3. Separability, concavity
of the instantaneous utility functions, perfect capital markets and certain
lifetimes imply that each individual will set his level of consumption equal
in all periods. Denoting y = wl, one can rewrite the budget constraint as
follows:
hc = zwl − T (y, z)
where
T (y, z) = zτ(wl)− (h− z)p(z), (3)
3Without such a restriction, l(t) would be decreasing over time.
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is the difference between total tax payments and total retirement benefits.
The function T (y, z) represents the net social security cum income tax paid
by an individual. Alternatively, we can think of −T (y, z) as the net transfer
an individual receives from the social security system. Differentiating T
yields the implicit tax on retirement that have estimated Gruber and Wise
[1999]. To see this note that
δT (y, z)
δz
= τ(wl) + p(z)− (h− z)p0(z). (4)
In words, an additional year of work may imply a double cost: the payroll
tax τ(wl) and foregone benefits if p(z) > 0. On the other hand, postponing
retirement may imply higher per period benefits during retirement. This
positive effect (negative cost) is captured by the third term on the RHS of
(4). In the rest of the paper, we use this reduced tax function T (y, z).
With c and l constant over time, lifetime utility is given by
U = hu (c)− V (l)R (z) , (5)
where
R (z) =
zZ
0
r(t)dt.
The function R (z) denotes the disutility for a working life of length z; we
have R0 (z) = r (z) > 0 and R00 (z) = r0(z) > 0. Labor disutility, regarding
the length of working life z, can be interpreted in terms of an indicator
of health. Healthy individuals accordingly would have a lower R(z) than
individuals whose poor health makes it harder to work beyond a certain
age. There is another term in the labor disutility which concerns the length
of work week, V (l). We assume that this function V (l) is the same for all.
In other words, there is no heterogeneity in this respect. This simplifying
assumptions is motivated by the fact that we want to focus on the retirement
decision rather than on the determination of weekly labor supply.
6
Each individual is characterized by two parameters: his productivity
level wi and his disutility for the retirement age Rj (z) = R(z;αj) with
δR/δαj > 0. There are two levels of productivity wh and wl with wh > wl.
Similarly, the health status parameter takes two values with αh > αl so that
Rh (z) > Rl (z) for every z. Note that the subscript h when associated with
w, refers to the “good” (high productivity) type, while h associated with α
is the “bad” (high disutility of remaining in the labor force) type. We denote
a type of individual with subscripts (i, j), i denoting the productivity index
and j the age of retirement disutility index.
3 The laissez-faire economy and the first best
3.1 The laissez faire
In a laissez-faire economy, deleting the subscripts referring to individuals
types, every agent solves the following problem:
max
l,z
h u
µ
wlz
h
¶
− V (l)R (z) (6)
The first order conditions with respect to l and z are respectively:
u0 (c)wz − V 0 (l) R (z) = 0 (7)
u0 (c)wl − V (l) R0 (z) = 0. (8)
With (7) and (8) one obtains the usual equality between marginal rates of
substitution between work and consumption and the corresponding relative
price:
MRScl =
V 0(l)R(z)
u0(c)
= wz (9)
MRScz =
V (l)R
0
(z)
u0(c)
= wl (10)
where MRSab stands for the marginal rate of substitution between a and b.
Combining (7) and (8), the tradeoff between l and z is determined by:
MRSlz =
V (l)R0(z)
V 0(l)R(z)
=
l
z
(11)
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zl
A
l=I/wz
Figure 1: The effort minimization problem
To interpret condition (11) observe that the maximization of (6) requires
the minimization of “effort” as described by the following dual problem.
min
l,z
E = V (l)R(z) (12)
s.t. I = wlz,
where I represents lifetime earnings andE denotes aggregate effort (or utility
cost). Figure 1 represents problem (12) in the (z, l) space.
The curve with equation l = I/wz represents all the combinations of
(z, l) that yield a given level of lifetime income I. Note that the slope of
this curve is given by −I/wz2 = −l/z. To maximize utility it is necessary
that this income level be produced so as to minimize the lifetime disutility
of labor (effort). The shaded area represents the (z, l) combinations that
generate a level of effort lower than or equal to a fixed level E. The optimal
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(non distorted) (z, l) choice is given by the point A satisfying
R0(z)/R(z)
V 0(l)/V (l)
=
l
z
that is, where the marginal rate of substitution between l and z is equal to
the slope of the lifetime earnings curve; this is of course exactly equivalent
to condition (11). Rearranging the terms, one obtains:
εV (l) ≡
lV 0(l)
V (l)
=
zR0(z)
R(z)
≡ εR(z) (13)
which corresponds to an equality between the elasticities of disutility for the
work week εv(l) and that for the retirement age εR(z). For simplicity, we
shall refer to the first one as the “work week elasticity” and to the second
one as the “retirement elasticity”.
We assume the two following monotonicity properties:
• Assumption 1 : εV (l) and εRj (z) (j = h, l) are non decreasing functions
(of l and z respectively).4
• Assumption 2 : For every z one has εRl(z) 6 εRh(z). In words, for any
given age of retirement, the retirement elasticity of the more disabled
individual is greater than or equal to the retirement elasticity of the
more healthy individual.
These two assumptions allow us to compare the two optimal choices of
l and z for the same aggregate earnings I with two individuals differing
respectively in their productivity and their preferences for retirement.
Let us start with the case where individuals differ solely in their produc-
tivity. In figure 2, the more able individual (individual 2) chooses both a
lower z and a lower l. This is the case if εR(z) and εV (l) are strictly increas-
ing functions of z and l. For the special cases where R or V are isoelastic
4A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that:
(i) 1 +
lV 0(l)
V (l)
− lV
00(l)
V (l)
> 0 for every l ;
(ii) 1 +
zR0(z)
R(z)
− zR
00(z)
R(z)
> 0 for every z.
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zl
(I,w1)
(I,w2)
z1
l1
z2
l2
1
2
w1<w2
R2(z)=R1(z)
Figure 2: Choices of (z, l) for the two productivity types
functions, the choice of either l (horizontal arrow) or z (vertical arrow) are
the same for the two individuals (see equation (13)). To sum up, Assump-
tion 1 ensures that for a given level of lifetime earnings, the (l, z) choice of
an individual with a higher ability lies south west of the point chosen by a
less able individual.
We now turn to the case where individuals solely differ in their health
status, where Assumption 2 becomes relevant. Figure 3 shows that the
individual who has a greater disutility for the retirement age (individual 2)
will choose a higher l and a lower z than the other individual if the marginal
rate of substitution between l and z is higher for this individual, that is,
if εRh(z) > εRl(z). In the extreme example where εRh(z) = εRl(z), the
two iso-effort curves will be parallel in the z, l space so that for the same
aggregate earnings, they will choose the same pair z, l.
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(I,w)
z
l
2
1
z2
l2
z1
l1
w1 = w2
R2(.) = Rl(.)
R1(.) = Rh(.)
Figure 3: Choices of (z, l) for the 2 health types
3.2 The social optimum
The above market solution can be contrasted with the first best social op-
timum which obtains when the social planner observes wi and Rj . We
consider a utilitarian social welfare function given by
P
ij fijUij , where fij
is the proportion of type ij’s individuals, and Uij = hu (cij)−V (lij)Rj (zij)
is the lifetime utility of ij individuals.5 Welfare maximization is subject to
the resource constraint that aggregate consumption cannot exceed aggregate
production. This problem is given by:
max
cij ,`ij ,zij
X
i,j
fij [hu (cij)− V (lij)Rj (zij)]− µ
X
i
fij (hcij − wilijzij) ,
(14)
5We consider the utilitarian case to keep the expressions as simple as possible. Our
analysis can easily be generalized to the case where social welfare is a weighted sum of
individual utilities. This would not affect our main results. However, some specific results
may change and some assumptions on the weights may be necessary; see footnote 11.
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where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint.
The first order conditions for every i, j are:
u0 (cij)− µ = 0 (15)
V 0 (lij) Rj (zij)− µwi zij = 0 (16)
V 0 (lij) R0j (zij)− µwi lij = 0 (17)
Combining these expression we find for every type i, j the non distorted
tradeoffs described by equations (9), (10) and (11). In addition, (15) requires
identical consumption levels for all individuals.6
With the reduced form utility function (5), the time dimension is im-
plicit. In the laissez-faire solution there is implicitly saving during the
working period: (wilij − cij) zij which is used to finance consumption dur-
ing retirement: (h− zij) cij ; recall that we have assumed a zero interest
rate. Consequently, the first best allocation c∗ij , l
∗
ij , z
∗
ij can be decentralized
through a social security scheme with a non distortionary (lump-sum) con-
tribution
³
wil
∗
ij − c∗ij
´
z∗ij and (lump-sum) social security benefits equal to³
h− z∗ij
´
c∗ij . The number of hours lij and the age of retirement zij would
be chosen optimally according to (15) and (16) coinciding with the first-best
tradeoffs.
The first-best solution and its decentralization have been derived under
the assumption that individual types wi and Rj are observable. When there
is asymmetric information, first-best lump sum transfers are (generally) not
feasible; redistribution then has to rely on potentially distortionary taxes
and transfers based on observable variables. In the remainder of the paper,
we adopt an information structure that is inspired by the optimal taxation
literature. Specifically, we assume that productivities, wi, labor supply lij
and health status Rj are not observable, while (weekly) before tax income
yij = lijwi is observable. And added feature of our analysis compared to
6When social welfare puts different weights on the individual utilities, the marginal
social valuations of consumption, rather than the actual consumption levels, must be the
same for all individuals.
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conventional optimal tax models is that the retirement age zij is also ob-
servable. Taxes and transfers can then be based both on y and on z. We
use a non linear tax function T (y, z) which, as shown by (3), accounts for
income taxation, payroll taxes and retirement benefits.
The assumption that productivity and health status cannot be observed
by public authorities but are fully known by individuals is a strong though
standard assumption. In fact even with imperfect observability our results
would hold true as long as there is asymmetry of information. Also the
assumption that individuals know their health status at the beginning could
be a problem in a truly intertemporal model. However, here the multiperiod
dimension is collapsed into a single period. We come back on this in the final
section.
4 Second best taxation
4.1 Implementation
Let us first examine how an individual’s choices are affected by a non-linear
income tax schedule T (y, z). The first-order condition of this modified in-
dividual problem are crucial for understanding the implementation of the
optimal tax policy derived below. The individual’s problem now becomes
maxu(cij)− V (
yij
wi
)Rj(zij)
s.t. cij = yijzij − T (yij , zij)
From the first order conditions, one obtains:
MRSijcl = wizij
µ
1− 1
zij
∂T (yij , zij)
∂yij
¶
(18)
MRSijcz = yij
µ
1− 1
yij
∂T (yij , zij)
∂zij
¶
(19)
and the implicit relation between l and z being:
MRSijlz =
lij
zij
[1− θij ] (20)
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where
θij =
T ijz /yij − T ijy /zij
1− T ijy /zij
(21)
θij is the marginal tax rate of z with respect to l.
Distortions in the (l, c) and (z, c) choices are assessed by comparing (18)
and (19) to their laissez-faire counterparts (9) and (10). Not surprisingly, a
positive marginal tax on either l or z implies a downward distortion on the
corresponding variable.
Let us now turn to the tradeoff between z and l. Comparing (20) to its
laissez-faire and first-best counterpart, (11) shows that when θij is equal to
zero, there is no distortion (in the tradeoff between z and l). This is true
in particular when T (yij , zij) = T (yijzij), so that the tax depends only on
total lifetime income. Furthermore, if θij is negative z is encouraged with
respect to l, while a positive θij implies a distortion in favor of l.7
An alternative view on these distortions consists in saying that the choice
between z and l is distorted downwards if individuals who retire earlier pay
less taxes, for a given level of before tax lifetime income I, that is, when:8
dT (yij , zij)
dzij
¯¯¯¯
I
=
∂T (yij , zij)
∂zij
− yij
zij
∂T (yij , zij)
∂yij
> 0 (22)
Using (21) it appears that (22) amounts to θij > 0.9 Consequently the two
alternative ways to define the distortions are effectively equivalent.
4.2 The second best optimum
To determine the second best optimum, we concentrate on settings with two
types only (each of which being characterized by a specific value for the two
7The distortions mentioned here are substitution effects, for given levels of I.
8 In the same way, there will be a upwards distortion of the (z, l) choice when:
dTij(yij , zij)
dyij
¯¯¯¯
I
=
dTij(yij , zij)
dyij
− zij
yij
dTij(yij , zij)
dzij
> 0
9As long as 1−T ijy /zij > 0, a condition which necessarily holds at an interior solution;
see (18).
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wi
Rj
0 wl wh
Rl
Rh
(b)
(a)
AB
C D
Figure 4: The configuration of types
parameter of heterogeneity). We assume that the correlation between the
two characteristics is non positive10. Figure 4 illustrates three possible cases
with the arrow representing the direction of the binding incentive constraint;
see below.
We will first present the general case where the two types effectively differ
in the two dimensions (represented by the diagonal arrow in the graphic).
Then we consider two subcases where heterogeneity is only in one dimension.
Subcase (a) will refer to the case where both individuals have the same
preference over the age of retirement but differ in their productivity. Subcase
(b) will refer to the case where both agents differ in their preference for the
age of retirement but have the same productivity.
Formally, the economy is composed of two agents 2 (= hl) and 1 (= lh)
being characterized respectively by a pair (w2 = wh, R2(z) = Rl(z)) and
10We exclude the strict positive correlation case for which little can be said except when
one difference overwhelmingly dominates the other.
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(w1 = wl, R1(z) = Rh(z)), with strict inequalities w2 > w1 and R2(z) <
R1(z). In case (a), the two agents will have, R1(z) = R2(z) = Rh(z) and in
case (b) w1 = w2 = wh.
The problem of the government is directly obtained from (14) to which
we add the incentive compatibility constraint that agent 2 does not want to
mimic agent 1.11 This yields the following problem:
max
ci,yi,zi
X
i
fiUi + µ
ÃX
fi
i
(yizi − hci)
!
+λ
µ
hu(c2)− V (
y2
w2
)R2(z2)− hu(c1) + V (
y1
w2
)R2(z1)
¶
where µ and λ denote the multipliers associated with the revenue and the
incentive compatibility constraints.12 First order conditions with respect to
ci, yi and zi are:
f1u
0(c1)− µf1 − λu0(c1) = 0 (23)
f2u
0(c2)− µf2 + λu0(c2) = 0 (24)
− f1
w1
V 0(l1)R1(z1) + µf1z1 +
λ
w2
V 0(
_
l2)R2(z1) = 0 (25)
− f2
w2
V 0(l2)R2(z2) + µf2z2 −
λ
w2
V 0(l2)R2(z2) = 0 (26)
− f1V (l1)R01(z1) + µf1y1 + λV (
_
l2)R
0
2(z1) = 0 (27)
− f2V (l2)R02(z2) + µf2y2 − λV (l2)R02(z2) = 0 (28)
where the upper bar denotes the choice of the mimicker, so that
_
l2 = y1/w2,
i.e., the quantity of labor type 2 must supply to earn y1.
Combining (24), (26) and (28), one obtains non distorted tradeoffs for
type 2; marginal rates of substitution for this individual continue to be given
11 In the utilitarian case (and with the considered configuration of types) this constraint
is necessarily binding. However when, the social welfare function is a weighted sum of
individual utilities and when the weight of the (able and/or healthy) type 2 is sufficiently
large this may not be true anymore. Though formally possible, this does not appear to be
a particular relevant case to consider. For the rest, as long as the constraint from 2 to 1
is binding, all our result in this section go through for a weighted social welfare function.
12When contrasting this with the first-best problem recall that index 2 stands for hl,
while 1 stands for lh. Also note that we now optimize with respect to y (observable
variable) rather than l.
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by (9)—(11). From (18) (19) and (20) this implies that marginal tax rates
with respect to y and z are zero so that we also have θ2 = 0. This is the
usual no distortion at the top property.
We now turn to individual 1 and study successively his tradeoffs in the
(l1, c1), (z1, c1) and (l1, z1) planes. This leads us to the determination of the
marginal income tax rate and the marginal implicit tax on continued labor
force participation which apply to this individual. We can also study how
(if at all) his tradeoff between weekly and lifetime labor supply is affected.
4.2.1 Marginal income tax rate
Equation (23) and (26) yield:
MRS1cl =


1− λ
f1
1− λ
f1
w1
w2
MRS
2
cl
MRS1cl

w1z1, (29)
where MRS
2
denotes individual 2’s marginal rate of substitution when
mimicking individual 1. We have MRS1cl > MRS
2
cl because l2 < l1 and
R2(z1) < R1(z1). Consequently, (29) implies MRS1cl < w1z1 so that there
is a marginal downward distortion in the work week. In other words, by
equation (18), the marginal tax on weekly income, y, is positive. This prop-
erty does not come as a surprise and it is in line with the standard property
obtained in the optimal income tax literature.
4.2.2 Marginal tax on continued labor force participation
Now combining equation (23) and (27) one obtains:
MRS1cz =


1− λ
f1
1− λ
f1
w1
w2
MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz

 y1 (30)
where MRS1cz > MRS
2
cz. Consequently, one has MRS
1
cz < y1 so that there
is a marginal downward distortion on z1. That is, for a given weekly labor
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supply, the individual is induced to choose a lower z relative to c than he
would do in a first best setting. By equation (19), the marginal tax on the
retirement age is positive. Intuitively this property can be explained by the
fact that type 1 individuals have steeper indifference curves at any given
point in the (z, c) space than type 2 individuals. This is because type 1
individuals must be compensated more to accept to work longer than the
mimicking individual (they are less healthy and have a higher weekly labor
supply). This implies that, starting from the first best tradeoff, a variation
dz1 < 0 along with a variation dc1 = (MRS1cz)dz1 has no (first-order) effect
on the utility of type 1, but it decreases the utility of type 2 mimicking
type 1. Consequently, the downward distortion in z1 is a way to relax an
otherwise binding self selection constraint.
To interpret this result it is useful to recall (4) which relates ∂T/∂z to
the implicit tax that the pension system imposes on continued labor force
participation. It thus appears that it is optimal to adopt a retirement system
with a benefit formula which induces early retirement for the low ability (and
high disutility) individual.
A remarkable feature of this result is that it holds irrespective of the
exact structure of heterogeneity.13 To be more precise the result obtains
just as well for a case where individuals differ mainly (or even solely) in
productivity as it holds for the case where they differ mainly (or exclusively)
in health status.
13As long as health and productivity are positively correlated so that incentive con-
straints bind from the healthy productive to the unhealthy low productivity individuals.
Observe that the result can also be extended beyond two types, as long as the same pat-
tern of binding incentive constraints arise. This is not a serious restriction when there
is a one to one and positive relationship beweent health status and productivity. It is
more problematic, though in a truely multidimensional setting; see Cremer, Pestieau and
Rochet (2001) for a discussion.
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4.2.3 Weekly vs. lifetime labor supply
Combining equations (29) and (30), we find:
MRS1lz =


1− λ
f1
w1
w2
MRS
2
cl
MRS1cl
1− λ
f1
MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz


l1
z1
, (31)
which, as shown in Appendix A implies
MRS1lz =
R01(z1)/R1(z1)
V 0(l1)/V (l1)
T l1
z1
⇔ εV (l1)
εV (l2)
T εR1(z1)
εR2(z1)
. (32)
Regarding the tradeoff between l and z we thus obtain an ambiguous result.
Whether the (z, l) is distorted upward or downward (i.e., whether θ1 is
negative or positive) depends upon the relative differences in characteristics.
If the ratio between week labor elasticities of individual 1 and the mimicker
and is larger than the one between retirement elasticities, the (z, l) choice
is upward distorted (θ1 < 0). Otherwise, it is downward distorted (θ1 > 0).
In order to better understand the role of the relative differences in the two
characteristics, two extreme cases are now considered. Throughout this
discussion, we have to keep in mind that we are talking here about relative
distortions between l and z; we know from the previous subsections that
both of these variables are effectively distorted downward (relative to the
numeraire good). Roughly speaking we are thus now determining which
type of labor supply faces the most heavy distortion.
4.2.4 Subcase (a): R1(z) = R2(z)
In this case, individuals differ only in productivity. Consequently, we have
εR1(z1) = εR2(z1) and (32) simplifies to:
MRS1lz =
R01(z1)/R1(z1)
V 0(l1)/V (l1)
T l1
z1
⇔ εV (l2) S εV (l1). (33)
First notice that when V is isoelastic, the (z1, l1) choice is not distorted. As
discussed earlier, if V is isoelastic, z is fixed and equal for both individuals.
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The weekly income is then distorted downwards while the age of retirement
is the same as in the first-best.
In the general case, when εV is increasing (Assumption 1), we have
εV (l2) < εV (l1) yielding MRS1lz > l1/z1, the marginal rate of substitution
between l and z is greater in absolute value than the slope of the gross
income curve. From (21) this is equivalent to θ1 < 0. Consequently, for a
given I, individual 1 has, at the second best a greater z and a lower l relative
to the first best choice.14
This result is an interesting extension of the optimal income taxation
literature. The intuition can be understood most easily by considering the
slope of individual indifference curves in the (z, y) space (i.e., the space of
observable variables). When the elasticity of V is increasing (in l), individual
2 prefers to have a relatively greater weekly income than individual 1 for
a given gross life cycle income. Consequently, the slope of the iso effort
curve (indifference curve) is lower for individual 2 in the (z, y) space; see
Appendix B. To make type 1’s consumption bundle less attractive to type
2 (and relax an otherwise binding incentive constraint), the optimal policy
then implies a relatively higher retirement age and a lower weekly labor
supply for individual 1.15
4.2.5 Subcase (b): w1 = w2
Individuals now differ solely in their health status and (32) reduces to
MRS1lz =
R01(z1)/R1(z1)
V 0(l1)/V (l1)
T l1
z1
⇔ εR2(z1) T εR1(z1). (34)
When R1 and R2 have the same elasticity (for any given level of z), there
is no distortion for the (l1, z1) choice. A simple example of this is when
R1(z) = δR2(z) with δ > 1. As shown previously, the (l, z) choices are the
same for the 2 individuals for a given gross life cycle income.
14But I is of course not the same as in the first-best. Consequently this property is not
in contradiction to the fact that z faces a positive marginal tax (and is distorted downward
with regard to the numeraire). .
15The argument presented above for the (z, c) space can easily be adapted to apply here.
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In the general case when εR2(z1) < εR1(z1) (Assumption 2) we obtain
MRS1lz < l1/z1, so that the slope of the effort frontier is lower than the slope
of the gross income line. Using (21) we thus obtain θ1 > 0. Consequently,
for I given, at the second best, the individual will choose a greater l and a
lower z relative to the first best choice. In this special case, early retirement
is encouraged.
This result is in contrast with that obtained in the previous subsection.
This can be explained as follows. Individual 2 now prefers to have a (rela-
tively) higher retirement age than individual 1 for a given gross life cycle
income (the slope of the iso-effort curve is greater for individual 2 in the
(z, y) space; see Appendix B). Consequently, the incentive constraint can
be relaxed by setting a relatively lower retirement age and a greater weekly
labor supply for individual 1.
5 Numerical examples
We now present some numerical examples which illustrate our results. In
particular, they highlight the role of the relative differences in characteris-
tics. In addition, we provide some results for the three types case, a setting
not considered in the analytical part. We use a quasi-linear utility function
which implies that there are no income effects on labor supply. This leads to
crisper results and facilitates their interpretation. However, it also imposes
the restriction that everyone has the same marginal utility of income. To in-
troduce concern for redistribution we thus consider a social welfare function
of the type
P
ij fijΦ [Uij ] , where Φ is a strictly concave function reflecting
social preference for equity. The following specific functions are used:
Φ(x) = x1−ρ/(1− ρ), u(c) = c,
V (l) = 1/(1− l)β, Rj(z) = 1/(1− z)αj
with fixed parameters β = 2, ρ = 2. The distribution of characteristics is
uniform.
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TABLE 1: Case (a): α1 = α2 = 2
c l z T 0z T 0y θ
(a1): w1 = 200, w2 = 250
Individual 1 First Best 68 0.55 0.55
Second Best 63 0.538 0.547 6.16 0.05 −0.038
Individual 2 First Best 74 0.57 0.57
Second Best 78 0.57 0.57
(a2): w1 = 200, w2 = 300
Individual 1 First Best 77 0.55 0.55
Second Best 69 0.533 0.545 9.19 0.07 −0.049
Individual 2 First Best 88 0.59 0.59
Second Best 93 0.59 0.59
(a3): w1 = 200, w2 = 400
Individual 1 First Best 95 0.55 0.55
Second Best 86 0.532 0.543 10.39 0.07 −0.045
Individual 2 First Best 118 0.61 0.61
Second Best 124 0.61 0.61
For each simulation, we report the optimal allocations (c, l and z), marginal
tax rates on z and l and the relative marginal tax rates θ’s. Tables 1 and
2 present the results for case (a) where individuals only differ in ability wi,
and case (b) where individuals differ in their health status Rj(z). Then, Ta-
ble 3 presents an example with two types who differ both in ability and in
health. Finally, we consider a setting with three individuals as represented
by ABC on Figure 4.
Table 1 presents the case where the two individuals are equally healthy
but have different productivities, the ratio w2/w1increasing from 1.25 to 2.
In this special case, the informational problem rests on the components of
y1 namely w1 and l1; the relative distortion goes against l. One observes
that l decreases more than z relative to their first-best values. Naturally,
there is no distortion for type 2’s individuals.
Table 2 presents the case where the two types are equally productive
but have different health conditions. The ratio α1/α2 goes from 1.18 to 2.
Now li can be directly inferred from yi and is thus effectively observable.
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TABLE 2: Case (b) : w1 = w2 = 200
c l z T 0z T 0y θ
(b1): α1 = 2,α2 = 1.7
Individual 1 First Best 64 0.55 0.55
Second Best 60 0.549 0.546 4.43 0.01 0.014
Individual 2 First Best 65 0.56 0.6
Second Best 68 0.56 0.6
(b2): α1 = 2, α2 = 1.4
Individual 1 First Best 68 0.55 0.55
Second Best 62 0.546 0.538 10.62 0.03 0.032
Individual 2 First Best 71 0.58 0.66
Second Best 75 0.58 0.66
(b3): α1 = 2, α2 = 1
Individual 1 First Best 75 0.55 0.55
Second Best 66 0.542 0.53 15.91 0.05 0.044
Individual 2 First Best 79 0.61 0.76
Second Best 85 0.61 0.76
The distortion is on the age of retirement of type 1. We can see that the
distortion goes against z which falls more than l.
Table 3 considers two individuals corresponding to A and C on Figure
4. Whether or not z is more distorted than l depends on the relative ratios
w2/w1 and R1/R2. Not surprisingly for w2/w1 given (and equal to 1.2),
as R1/R2 or rather α1/α2 increases, the relative downward distortion first
affects l1and then z1and we go from θ > 0 to θ < 0. For a specific interme-
diate level of the health ratio, namely α1/α2 = 1.43 there is no distortion in
the (z, l) tradeoff and we have θ = 0.
Finally Table 4 is devoted to the 3 individuals case. Returning to Figure
4, these three individuals are represented by A, B, C. With that configura-
tion one may expect the self-selection constraint to go downwards from A to
B (healthy and more productive mimicking healthy and less productive) and
from B to C (healthy and less productive mimicking unhealthy and less pro-
ductive). However, our results indicate that the pattern of binding incentive
constraints may be more complex than this conjecture would suggest.
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TABLE 3: Strict negative correlation, w1 = 200, w2 = 240
c l z T 0z T 0y θ
α1 = 2, α2 = 1.7
Individual 1 First Best 71 0.55 0.55
Second Best 63 0.537 0.541 10.71 0.06 −0.015
Individual 2 First Best 77 0.58 0.62
Second Best 82 0.58 0.62
α1 = 2, α2 = 1.4
Individual 1 First Best 76 0.55 0.55
Second Best 67 0.535 0.535 14.58 0.07 0
Individual 2 First Best 84 0.60 0.68
Second Best 90 0.60 0.68
α1 = 2, α2 = 1
Individual 1 First Best 85 0.55 0.55
Second Best 74 0.534 0.531 17.24 0.08 0.012
Individual 2 First Best 94 0.63 0.77
Second Best 101 0.63 0.77
TABLE 4: 3 individuals with: w1 = w2 = 200, w3 = 400.
c l z T 0z T 0y θ
α1 = 2,α2 = α3 = 1.5.
Individual 1 First Best 145 0.764 0.618
Second Best 131 0.760 0.605 15.64 0.045 0.03
Individual 2 First Best 146 0.787 0.711
Second Best 140 0.769 0.702 19.29 0.123 -0.06
Individual 3 First best 168 0.83 0.76
Second Best 182 0.83 0.76
α1 = 2,α2 = α3 = 1.8.
Individual 1 First Best 135.2 0.764 0.618
Second Best 125 0.763 0.613 6.04 0.016 0.013
Individual 2 First Best 135.7 0.772 0.653
Second Best 128 0.755 0.645 17.31 0.106 -0.059
Individual 3 First best 158 0.81 0.71
Second Best 170 0.81 0.71
α1 = 2,α2 = α3 = 1.9.( IC 31 binding)
Individual 1 First Best 132 0.764 0.618
Second Best 124.2 0.762 0.615 4 0.015 0
Individual 2 First Best 132.3 0.768 0.635
Second Best 124.8 0.752 0.627 15.4 0.09 -0.04
Individual 3 First best 154 0.81 0.69
Second Best 166 0.81 0.69
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We focus on the health ratio α1/α2, with α1 = αh and α2 = α3 = αl.
Three examples are studied with the ratio αh/αl decreasing from 4/3 to 1.
When the ratio is sufficiently large, the self-selection constraints go along the
sequence ABC. Type 3 is subject to no distortion. Type 2 – less productive
than 1 but equally healthy – is subject to the same distortion as in subcase
(a): downward distortion on l relatively stronger than that on z. Type 3 is
subject to the same distortion as in subcase (b): downward distortion on z
relatively stronger than that on l. The same pattern of results holds when the
health ratio starts to decrease from 12/9 to 10/9. However, when it becomes
sufficiently small, the incentive compatibility constraint between type 3 and
type 1 becomes binding. In other words, both individuals 2 and 3 now have
to be prevented from mimicking type 1 who benefits from an attractive early
age of retirement. As a consequence, the marginal tax on type 1 individuals
has to compromise between two binding incentive constraints. To be more
precise, the incentive constraint 3 → 1 pushes θ1 to be negative. This is
because the disparity between w3 and w1 dominates the disparity between
α3 and α1. The incentive constraint 2 → 1, on the other hand, pushes θ1
to be positive. As a consequence, the net distortion is ambiguous. For the
parameter values we reported it happens be just equal to zero. Finally, for
individual 2, there is a relative subsidy on z which decreases as the health
ratio decreases.
6 Conclusion
During the last decades, a number of European countries, some more than
others, have expanded their social security systems in ways which have dis-
couraged labor market participation in old age and thus fostered early re-
tirement. We raised the question whether these disincentives to continued
activity are necessarily the result of a bad tax-transfer scheme design. Can
they instead be an ingredient of an optimally designed redistributive policy
in a world of asymmetric information?
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To address this issue, we have studied the design of retirement contri-
bution and benefits in a setting where an optimal non-linear income tax is
also available. Individuals differ in ability and/or health status (disutility
of retirement age). Given the tax-transfer policy every individual chooses
weekly labor supply (not observable) and retirement age (observable). As in
the traditional income taxation literature, the optimal policy implies a pos-
itive marginal tax on the low ability (and/or less healthy) individual. More
interestingly, the retirement benefit formula also introduces a bias towards
early retirement in this individuals life cycle labor supply decisions. This
distortion arises whatever the dominant source of heterogeneity (productiv-
ity or health). Finally, the relative distortion between weekly labor supply
and retirement age (length of active life), if any, depends on the relative
heterogeneity in ability and health.
This paper has some rather ambitious features. It aims at dealing with
the question of disability, early retirement and regular retirement within the
same model with individuals differing in both productivity and health. To
pursue this ambition, we admittedly had to simplify other aspects of the
model. Two of the key assumptions are that of constant (though endoge-
nous) labor supply during the active life and that of no liquidity constraint.
These two restrictions allow us to reduce an otherwise dynamic model into
a static one.
In the same vein, we have assumed that there is no uncertainty as to the
health status. This restriction implies that some interesting issues raised
by disability insurance and social security cannot be accounted for in our
setting. One of the classical contributions on disability and retirement is
that of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986). Their model assumes identical
individuals at the beginning of the process. Then, until the endogenous age
of retirement each worker faces the risk of being disabled. Disabled workers
are provided with some benefit financed out of a payroll tax and chosen in
such a way to avoid able workers to pass for disabled. The main finding is
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that benefits increase over time while taxes decrease.
We assume that not just productivity but also health (capacity to work
long) are not observable. In the standard literature on disability health is
also not directly observable. However, some authors introduce the possibility
of control which at some cost reveals the health status; see e.g., Diamond
and Sheshinski (1995). Audit on health conditions can be introduced in
our model and this will be the subject of a sequel to this paper. While the
possibility of audit does bring in a number of additional interesting aspects,
it does not appear to represent a fundamental challenge to the main findings
of this paper. One can expect that the optimal policy mix will effectively
involve some auditing (provided that it is not too expensive) and that this
will result in relaxing the self-selection constraint. One can also expect that
the optimal policy will continue to induce early retirement. As for the
specific policy implications, one can conjecture that thanks to such audits
early retirement benefits that are implicit to our optimal scheme will be
higher than when audits are not available.
Another possible and natural extension is to allow for some health spend-
ing to correct for a high Rj . In other words, the health status would continue
to have an exogenous (adverse selection) component, but it would also be
affected by some specific expenditure which may or may not be observable.
In particular public provision of such a private good could be used as an
additional instrument along with our social security scheme. (See on this
Cremer and Gahvari, 1995). The underlying argument here would be to
reduce the incidence of disability rather than simply redistributing towards
the less able. One can conjecture that if this instrument can contribute to
narrow the gap between Rh and R` its availability would lead to a welfare
improvement.
Alternative specifications could lead to different outcomes. In particular
we deliberately assume that the utilitarian social planner takes into account
differences in utilities without trying to correct them. In other words, it
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takes Rj as a health parameter and not as a taste parameter. People with
Rh are unhealthy and ought to be compensated for that. If Rj were viewed
as taste for leisure, then it would make sense to launder out differences in
Rj . (See on this Boadway et al. (2002)).
With laundering out the result would change with tax inducement to-
wards postponed activity for the Rh’s workers now considered as “lazy”.
In the same line we could have assumed some myopic intertemporal prefer-
ences leading to overly early retirement. Again if the social planner had less
myopic time preferences the tax design could have been different.
Allowing for an explicit account of the time structure is clearly a priority
on our research agenda. It is, however, a challenging objective in a setting
with two, albeit correlated, factors of heterogeneity. Currently, there exists
little work even on the separate issues of either health or productivity. On the
health issue, there are naturally the papers by Diamond and Mirrlees (1987,
1986) which demonstrate the analytical difficulty of the question at hand.
On the productivity issues, Britto et al. (1991) have shown how difficult is
the issue of optimal non-linear income tax in a multiperiod setting. In view
of these difficulties, it should not be surprising that the design an optimal
tax-transfer scheme with intensive and extensive labor supply choices in
a dynamic setting and with two characteristics is a formidable task. Our
current paper clearly falls short of accomplishing this task. It is however
a step in that direction which points at possible avenues for tackling more
ambitious settings.
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Appendix
A Derivation of expression (32)
Rearranging (31) yields
MRS1lz =


1− λn1
w1
w2
MRS
2
cl
MRS1cl
1− λn1
MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz

 l1
z1
Consequently,
MRS1lz T
l1
z1
⇔ MRS
2
cz
MRS1cz
T w1
w2
MRS
2
cl
MRS1cl
Using the definition of MRS1cz and MRS
1
cl, the property w1 = w2
_
l2/l1and
rearranging yields
MRS1lz T
l1
z1
⇔
l1V 0(l1)
V (l1)
_
l2V 0(
_
l2)
V (l2)
T
R01(z1)
R1(z1)
R02(z1)
R2(z1)
.
Multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the right hand side by
z1 then yields (32).
B Marginal rates of substitution in the (z, y) space
We compare the types marginal rates of substitution between y at z at any
given point (z, y). By definition, one has:
MRSijyz(y, z) =
V ( ywi )R
0
j(z)
1
wi
V 0
³
y
wi
´
Rj(z)
Multiplying and dividing by yz yields:
MRSijyz(y, z) =
y
z
V ( ywi )
y
wi
V 0
³
y
wi
´ zR0j(z)
Rj(z)
=
y
z
εRj (z)
εV
³
y
wi
´
Assumption 1 implies εV
³
y
wh
´
≤ εV
³
y
wl
´
, so that
MRShjyz (y, z) >MRSljyz(y, z) for every j = h, l.
31
Consequently, in subcase (a) we have
MRS2yz(y, z) >MRS1yz(y, z)
Similarly, Assumption 2, implies εRl (z) ≤ εRh (z) , so that
MRSihyz(y, z) >MRSilyz(y, z) for every i = h, l.
In subcase (b) we thus have
MRS2yz(y, z) ≤MRS1yz(y, z).
In the more general case of negative correlation between the two types, one
has
MRShlyz(y, z) TMRSlhyz(y, z) if and only if
εRl (z)
εV
³
y
wh
´ T εRh (z)
εV
³
y
wl
´ .
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